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During the first week of December, President Trump brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. His pledge was an end to years of warfare in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting strategy for instability emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy highlights the defining principle of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and ending wars—even as this squares with the new air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative reinforced this, commenting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Contradictions

This shift is consequential, but observers note it is premature to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s direct manner, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a senior fellow for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Geopolitical Neglect and Strains

In contrast to his immediate predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major dispute has broken out with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Relations and Selective Intervention

An analogous confrontation appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the harsh rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

Similar to Competitors

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.